Introduction
In research on colonial slavery, we find the role played by law and courts very much debated. Whereas Tannenbaum (1946) and legal historians like Watson (1989) attribute an important influence to legal tradition, especially to Roman law in the case of Latin America 2 , experts of modern and Colonial history show some reluctance to admit or do even frankly negate any influence of the law on the slave societies of the New World 3 . Following this, their formation would have been dictated by economic imperatives only 4 , making them unique in world history of slavery 5 . We may structure these contrasting views by some possible master narratives. The first one would state that Iberian slave law, characterized as milder and more humane than the slave law of the Common Law tradition of Great Britain by authors like Tannenbaum 6 , was not applied in the colonies, because of the disdain of New World's master class, unwilling to accept any restraints of exploitation. Therefore, state institutions like courts would have had no function in the regulation of the master-slave-relationship ("protective law" -"oppressive masters"). A second way to tell the story does not at all consider benign the peninsula's slave law as practiced at the end of the Middle Ages, but rather sees it as a slave law already fitting very well the interests of a master class, the reason why the colonizers used it to form their new slave societies. This master narrative fits the image of the role of courts in the shaping of (colonial) slave societies as one of mainly imposing cruel punishments for often minor offences of slaves and freedmen, thus forming just another instrument of repression in the hands of the master class.
This was a seamless continuation of the repressive and often inhuman practices on plantations. This narrative continues by argues that improvements achieved by slaves led to a derogation of archaic European slave law, forming a new, colonial and customary slave law ("oppressive law" and "oppressive masters" -"resistant slaves").
2 Among comparative studies inspired by Tannenbaum are Elkins (1959) , Klein (1967) , Degler (1971) ; Conrad (1994) , Scott (2005) , Cooper et al. (2000) , Landers (1999) , Ingersoll (1999) , Din (1999) , as well as the literature quoted in Bergard (2007) . 3 Cf. Osterhammel (2009) , who applies the metaphor of Roman law as an empty seashell, which could not give any form to modern slavery. 4 Figueira/Mendes (1977, esp. p. 33) . 5 Cf. Blackburn (1996, 3) : "radically new in character compared with prior forms of slavery"; Osterhammel (2009, 28) , Elsenhals (2007) . 6 Today, this view is quite rightly relativated.
legally nearly unrestricted power of the master class is interpreted as only limited by the slaves' successful negotiations and resistance. In a frequently quoted article, Cunha (1985) develops the thesis of the absence of state institutions and of metropolitan slave law in master-slave relationships, stressing the existence of customary law instead, developed in direct negotiations between the two parties or groups. As to the Brazilian context, we can link these interpretations to certain phases of historiography.
Slaves were interpreted as relatively passive victims of plantation capitalism, without any rights, by authors who number among the Escola Sociológica Paulista 7 (which fits best to the first master narrative). A younger generation of scholars, emerging since the 1980s, stresses the quality of slaves as historical subjects instead. In this context, the idea of slaves conquering rights becomes crucial 8 (this fits with the second or fourth master narrative). The still inspiring leading questions these debates provoke are: did a Brazilian slave law existe? And to what extent did it differ from Portuguese slave law?
The younger historiography began to pay attention to the civil branch of colonial courts and its mechanisms to define status. A person kept as a slave might have learned about a manumission given to him and sought a court to enforce it, or claimed a right to be freed following from a corresponding promise or last will. Or maybe a person living for years as a freedperson found herself discovered as a fugitive slave, and was suddenly called back into slavery, or liberty was revoked because of "ingratitude" or because of not paying the contracted installments of the price for freedom. Investigating such cases, commonly referred to as freedom suits (but better, because it is more neutral, and reflects more precisely both possible directions: status suits), began with studies like the pioneering one of Grinberg (1994) . Brazilian historians interpreted freedom suits as a relatively late development and mostly related them closely to the abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century 7 Gonçalves (2006, p. 25) , cites as examples Bastide/Fernandes (1959) , Costa (1988 ), Cardoso (1962 . 8 See, for example, the interpretation of manumissions as strategies of resistance by Paiva (1995) .
colonial era and broaden the scope of investigation to the Portuguese Atlantic, like the exemplary study of Pinheiro (2013) .
Although most of the freedom trials levied at the Portuguese National Archive (Torre de Tombo, ANTT) only date back to the era of Pombal and represent the dexterous implementation of the legislation against the importation of slaves and finally against slavery as such by the slaves and their supporters (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 17-18) , we have to go further and consider that already Portugal's medieval and early modern courts knew such claims of the "Moorish" unfree emanating from the "Reconquista". Unfortunately sources prior to the eighteenth century are extremely scarce, but there exist some traces 11 . In Évora, in the year 1582, Grácia "mourisca" Bertin (2004) , Eisenberg (1987) , Nishido (1993) , Gonçalves (2000) . For freedom trials see Chalhoub (1990) , Azevedo (2003); Gurgel (2004) . 10 See also Silva (2007, p. 141) . 11 To compensate a little bit this lack of sources I would like to quote works on Valencia in the 15th and Granada in the 16 th centuries. Blumenthal (2009, p. 210-217) Fonseca (2002,182 ff.) , quoting ADE, FN, Évora, Liv. 260, f. 77 v, 23.1.1587. 13 The record mentions a "causa e demanda que ele quer(ia) mover contra Beatriz Figueira, sua senhora que foi, sobre sua alforria, porquanto o quer(ia) fazer cativo deixando-o seu senhor forro" (ADE, FN, Évora, Livro 199, f. 59, in Fonseca (2002) .
a sufficient introduction to the subject of the freedom (or better: status) trial.
Since Pinheiro (2013) , the argument for the irrelevance of the courts for colonial slavery lost ground 15 . Even if she does not claim to have used a "formal comparative method" (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 18) , the sources used by Pinheiro at least implicitly also show that the legal bases and their application did not differ essentially between Portugal and Brazil. But the legal comparison may be further developed. The present article concentrates only on one small but crucial detail: preliminary injunctions about the factual situation of the person whose status was controversial during the proceedings, since the clash appearing in these suits, between the defense of property rights on the one side, and the right to freedom on the opposite one, was not only a question of substantive law, but expressed itself quite often fiercely during the proceedings 16 . Whereas the party whose status was questioned sought to experience the trial like a free person, the second party wanted to see that first one treated like chattel until the final sentence, as certain extrajudicial 17 and procedural manoeuvres reveal. This battle over the interim situation in many cases consumed the energies of parties and their lawyers for months. The present article investigates the instruments the jurisprudence developed to balance the opponents interests and while favoring one not completely putting into risk the other. Whereas enjoying unrestrained freedom during the trial the "slave" could use it for flight, being kept as a 14 Arquivo Nacional Torre de Tombo (ANTT), Feitos Findos (FF), Fundo Geral, Letra A, maço 1200, caixa 2403, processo 14. 15 Her explicit statement on p. 95 deserves full approval ("a Justiça foi sim um recurso aplicado em confrontos dessa natureza e [...] seu acionamento coloca em dúvida a dispensa da arena jurídica na resolução de tais conflitos e a aceitação do pleno exercício da vontade senhorial e patronal"); also her conclusions, p. 95, that especially the masters did use the courts as means to protect their peculiar property, the slaves. 16 These two aspects could have been seperated more sharply by Pinheiro. 17 A very blatant case of unlawful interference is reported by Blumenthal (2009, p. 213) : Pere, owner of Nicholau, a slave, but factually living in freedom, to work and earn money to buy his freedom, once tried to drag Nicholau, "literally, back into his service." Pere "had grabbed him by the hair, tearing out a large clump of it", but Nicholau could run away and find "shelter in a friend's house".
Some concluding remarks of Pinheiro form our point of departure. She claims that there were no specific determinations about the freedom trials in the Ordinances (Ordenações) or in other Portuguese laws. Most important would have been customary law ("usos") and the "stilus" ("estilo") of the courts (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 281 ).
This observation is incomplete to a certain extent. It is true, that the civil proceedings law of modern Portugal (including the special rules for freedom trials) was only fragmentarily codified in the Ordinances, so that the courts had to use the subsidiary sources mentioned in the famous passage of book II, chapter 9 of the Afonsine Ordinances 18 . Lawyers, however, had more liberty to cite the Ordinances, Roman Law and Canon Law directly, but also national and international legal doctrine, as well as codifications of other kingdoms, like the Siete Partidas of Spain. It is remiss not to mention these numerous legal references, or formants (Sacco, 1991) 19 , because in fact as a whole they form the early modern law of Portugal and Brazil 20 as a part of the much larger legal family of the early modern Civil Law, the "ius commune" 21 . Among the subsidiary sources mentioned by the Ordinances, special attention has to be paid to Roman Law, because the modern freedom trial quite obviously was anything but new. As one of the most important slave societies in the history of mankind, the Romans experienced status lawsuit 22 in the directions [rei vindicatio] in servitutem or 18 In the following ranking order: the stilus, the customary law, the Roman Law ("Leis Imperiais"), but the Canon Law ("Santos Cânones"), if the application of Roman Law would lead to sin. Accursius was declared the authoritative glossator, and if no solution could be found in his works, Bartolus should be consulted. As is well known, the Manueline Ordinances meant a certain opening, because the communis opinio now could be prevail over Accursius or Bartolus. 19 Speaking of formants, a very short but striking extract of a freedom trial of 15 th century Valencia (Blumenthal, 2009, p. 213) shall be quoted: The freedom of the slave in that special case could be legally based on "disposiciones de drets canonich e civil e de furs del present regne". 20 Pinheiro (2013, p. 137-150) describes the proceedings quite well, but there are only scarce quotations of contemporary doctrine, legal sources etc. to back this description. 21 In this short article I may not enter into the debate about the concept "ius commune". 22 In the Digest, the entire title 12 of book 40 is dedicated to them, and in the Justinian Code the entire title 16 of book 7 (cf. also 4.9 of the Theodosian Code 26 But I do take an unequivocal stand on the side of those who stress continuities rather than ruptures, namely because of the medieval development of slave law and slavery, as investigated by Nehlsen (1972) , who unfortunately concentrates on delicts commited by slaves and therefore does not touch our subject, the status suits, Verlinden (1955) and many others, and especially the phenomenon we may call "Mediterranean Colonialism" (Feldbauer et al., 2005) . I do reject, on the contrary, a rupture in the 15 th century (between medieval and modern slavery). A little bit clumsy on this matter is Delacampagne (2002) . He divides the book in three big parts, and lets the first part end with medieval century. This insinuates an important rupture between medieval Mediterranean and modern Atlantic slavery. Nevertheless, at the very first pages of the second part, Delacampagne stresses the continuity. 27 Gaudemet (1976) prefers that concept to reception. 28 On these debates see Duve (2012) . However, Genzmer's critique (quoted by Duve, 2012, p. 49 ) is not convincing. Genzmer (1953) still uses "reception" without any critical remarks, Genzmer (1958) already shows a certain distance, but only by using quotation marks. Genzmer (1961) wants to reject the concept becausee of its vastness and ambiguity. We may ask, if transplant or translation are less ambiguous and used in a more uniform way by authors working in the field… The concepts proposed by Genzmer (1961, p. 144) to replace "reception" ("infiltration" or "penetration") are worse, because their tendency to ignore the agency of the historical subjects is even stronger. Wieacker (1967, p. 132) defends the concept of reception partially against Genzmer, and also Sellert (1998) and Willoweit (2002) continue to use it. More recently, Giaro (2007) in a very nuanced article shows the deficits of the concept of transfer and therefore does not to abandon the concept of reception aas well. Maybe we have to use all the four of the concepts cumulatively, to explain the long and complex transfer of Roman law to the colonies and Native populations.
Interim injunctions in status trails -a brief outline of the development in Ancient Rome
The first difficulty, when we ask, if the ancient Roman status trial could have served as a model for the modern one, is that the Roman status trial did not exist.
Rather, as is the case with civil procedure law as a whole, its historical development passed through several changes during the more than 1,200 years of Roman history 29 .
In the era of the Republic, the person claimed as slave or claiming to be free, in terms of the capacity to sue and to be sued, was treated more like a piece of property, a Peixoto (2013, p. 14-23) . 30 Franciosi (1961, p. 231) : "oggetto di processo". The ritual of the rei vindicatio at that age is described in the Institutes of Gaius (4, 16). Both parties had to touch the claimed object with a bar (vindicta/festuca) and to speak a certain formula. After that, the magistrate asked both parties to leave the object ("mittite ambo rem (hominem)"). 31 The formula of a "normal" rei vindicatio was modificated: The adsertor had to pronounce "liberum esse", and the "owner" could pronounce, without modification, "meum esse" (Indra, 2011, p. 38) . 32 Existent at least since the early Republic (about BC 500), but very probably already during the age of the kings (Kaser/Hackl, 1996, 92) . On the freedom trial in the form of a legis actio see Sciortino (2010, ch. II) . 33 It was the famous medieval jurist Baldus de Ubaldis, in his commentary on the Justinian Code (3.4.3), who denoted freedom and slavery as quasi-possession. 34 For the modern Portuguese and Brazilian freedom trials this is very well demonstrated by Pinheiro (2013) , see the title of the first chapter of her thesis: "A posse e o usufruto da liberdade"). However, maybe the term "social condition" ("condição social") should have been avoided to denominate this factual situation, because for a lot of sociologists, legal status is one factor for the social condition (the social condition of a slave who lives on his/her own is not the same as of a free person who lives on her own). 35 The Roman jurist Gaius tells us in the Institutes (4.16), that this means, that the judge " interim aliquem possessorem constituebat". 36 We know this because of Livius, Ab urbe condita, III, 47, 56, 58, narrating the famous freedom trial of Virginia (Nicolau, 1933, p. 179-198; Franciosi, 1961, chapter 6, pp. 197 Nicolau (1933, p. 128 ) speaks of a "véritable droit de garde sur la personne du prétendu esclave et sur ses biens", and (p. 140) of a "certain pouvoir de l'adsertor sur le prétendu esclave", called custodia. The interim freedom of a slave was "une liberté […] surveillé". Franciosi (1961, p. 232) agrees: "Le vindiciae secundum libertatem attribuiscono la custodia dell'individuo a colui che ne asserisce la libertà"; see also Franciosi (1961, p.258) : The judge attributed possession to the adsertor (attribuzione del possesso all' adsertor libertatis"). 39 Sciortino remains vague to the question to what extent the adsertor libertatis could restrain the liberty of the "slave" (Sciortino, 2010, p. 156) . 40 Praedes litis et vindiciarum, see Degeneffe (2006) . 41 Especially in a procedure extra ordinem, the adsertor had to deposit a bail, securing the claimed owner against a loss of his potential slave (Nicolau, 1933, p. 116) . 42 At least the cautio pro praede was a satisdatio, i. e. a stipulatio substantiated by a bailsman (sponsor), Gaius, Inst. 4, 89 and 94, Kaser/Hackl (1996, p. 106, note 108) . It is controversial, if the status trial was possible at all in this form in both directions (Scortino, p. 2010, ch. III) . 43 See Sciortino (2010, ch. III) , who states that the freedom trial was dealt with in this form since the early Principate. The details about the possible form of the freedom trial in that age are highly controversial. Nicolau (1933, p. 145-147) holds the view that in freedom trials never was proceeded per sponsionem. Sciortino's main thesis is that neither the agere per formulam, nor the agere per sponsionem was possible for a trial with the direction "in libertatem". In that case, a praeiudicium an liber sit would have been developed early. But this controversy is not relevant for the main question of the present article, the interim measures. Unfortunately, Sciortino (2010) hardly deals with them. 44 D. 40.12.7.5. This made an ordinatio iudicii or litis ordinatio necessary in cases where it was dubious, if the person whose status was controversial in fact lived as free or as unfree at the beginning of the trial. 45 Kaser/Hackl (1996, p. 279) . Gaius, Inst. 4.91, may be interpreted in the way that the stipulatio pro praede and the cautio iudicatum solvi do not differ essentially. During classical times, the adsertor had to provide bail directly, not by a bailsman (Indra, 2011, p. 168 and 230-231) . Also concerning the agere per formulas it is controversial, if it is was possible in both directions (Sciortino, 2010, ch. III) . 46 That is more or less between AD 30 and AD 235. of freedom, who was maybe put into interim liberty directly, without custody by his adsertor (Franciosi, 1961, p. 231-232) contradictions. But we may identify some crucial elements, like the decision of the judge as to the roles of the parties and the respective factual situation of the "slave", the bail someone had to put to enable her/him to stay in factual freedom during the proceedings, or the possibility of custody in the case of not getting a proper (idoneus)
bailsman. (Trusen, 1962; Nehlsen-von Stryk, 1991; Litewski, 1999; Nörr, 2012) , which constituted the central legal basis of the freedom suit during the Middle Ages (for lack of sources unfortunately nearly unknown, at least concerning Portugal) and the Early Modern Age. In proceedings about chattels or real estate, the magistrate could make a preliminary decision of the possessory situation during the proceedings 50 called summariissimum or mandantum de manutenendo 51 from the fifteenth century onwards (Coing, 1985, p. 286-287 51 Translating manutenção we have to be very careful. "Maintenance", which is really the same word, juridically can be absolutely misleading! The civil law practice of maintaining someone in the possession of something, the institute of the mandatum de manutenendo of continental ius commune, has nothing in common with the common law's "writ of maintenance". 52 Against the idea that the summariisimmum could be detected in Roman law already: Sarmiento (1616, 128), Böhmer (1762, p. 637) . 53 One example is the case of Manuel Rodrigues of the year 1806, quoted by Pinheiro (2013, p. 62 In such a situation, the difficulty for the judge often was to decide if the person deprived of her factual liberty was to be considered simply a fugitive, without any right to enjoy freedom, or if the situation of her "possession of liberty" was so firm, that it was worth being protected.
The development in modern "ius commune", especially in Portugal
In the worst case, during the modern age the factual slave claiming his freedom had to continue under the authority of his master (Barbosa, 1712 servitutis") the owner was able to present. In some cases, the "slaves" who had remain under the authority of their masters could at least request the "owner" to guarantee, the individual would not be maltreated (cautio de non offendendo 57 ) or removed to a distant place (Otálora, 1570, p. 152 58 ; see cases below). Practice, "stilus", had developed a further mitigation of the slaves' situation -while litigating, the slave had to serve during three days of the week only, having three days off to be able to attend to his claim 59 . We see the property claim and the freedom claim both halfway and the one combined with the main action. A petition to be maintained in liberty could be filed in three procedural situations: As the main request of an ordinary possessory action, as the main request of an isolated summary action, or as a request for an interime measure. 54 During my current research I also have found freedom trials in the form of an actio spolii, but as this article is about interim measures only, I do not consider them here. 55 The canonists used the model of the interdict unde vi, cf. Goecke (1858) and Ruffini (1889) . 56 Cf. at footnote 48, above. In ANTT FF FG maço R 375, Rita Thereza (mulher preta) ./. Jozé Ferreira Mendes (von 1767), fol. 59 the lawyer justifies this with the circumstance, that the owner in return had to maintain the "slave". As legal authority he quotes Fragoso (1737, p. 622 Blumenthal (2009, p. 215) , that this was very similar in Valencia. In one case (see below) though, the days off were only two. 61 For the fifteenth century Valencia Blumenthal (2009, p. 215) reports that when "filing a demand for liberty, slaves turned themselves over into the protective custody of the governor. They would then be placed either in the city's prison or in a designated safe house. Nevertheless, in many instances, at a master's or mistress' urging, the court would release the slave back into their owner's custody. The court would only do so, however, upon receipt of a sworn promise from the master (or mistress) that they would neither physically harm the slave nor take him or her outside the city limits. In this way, the court worked to ensure the slaves could not be intimidated or bullied into withdrawing their claims." In one important example (p. 213, note 72), the mistress had to swear "de no maltractar aquella axi com si no fos sclava e aço sub pena de docents florins [...]" and to permit "que dos dies de la setmana ço es lo dimarts e lo divendres en lo apres dinar una hora en cascu dels dits dies que aquella puxa venir parlar e comunicar ab lo procurador e advocat per la present causa." The struggles and their solutions are amazingly similar to our own findings in Portugal and Brazil! But see also the case of Russian slave Anna (Blumenthal 2009, p. 215-216) , whose owner did violate such an oath, whipping her cruelly and transporting her out of the city. 62 Maybe this is the case in Blumenthal's (2009) In Lisbon, where blacks during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries formed about ten percent of the population, members of their well organized lay brotherhoods (the best known being the one of Our Lady of the Rosary) processed the streets collecting money to help unfree members to buy their freedom, and assisted their members in freedom suits, frequently as nominal plaintiffs of representative actions, or at the least in paying lawyers' fees. In 1767, the lawyer of the black slave Rita Thereza made a request that she should be deposited based on the fear that her assumed owner could block her right to continue the freedom trial against him 68 . The court conceded to the interim measure, but now the owner entered with an appeal, alleging that the whole matter was initiated by the depositary whose intention would be to fraudulently employ the services of the slave. He only wanted to grant the slave the usual three days off. It would be a small triumph for every slave, were it sufficient 66 To the disappointment of the "owners", who got to know about their deposited "slaves" strolling around. 67 Silva (1773) . 72 Cortiada follows the opinion, that a slave who fled to a church because he feared to be maltreated (or had already suffered maltreatment) by the owner ("si servus propter domini saevitiam […] ad Ecclesiam confugit"), had to be restituted to the latter ("dominus est restitutendus"), but only "recepto ab eo iuramento de illum non offendendo". Cortiada quotes several references from Roman and canon law, and more than a dozen of authors to back up his argument. In § 13 he continues, that in certain cases the cautio iuratoria could not be sufficient, but by the owner should be provided a stronger cautio ("recepta à domino maiori securitate"). For this opinion Cortiada quotes again several authors, like Farinacci, Diana, Barbosa. Cortiada does not say, if this stronger cautio was pignoraticia or fideiussoria; maybe both of them were possible. If the owner was not willing to provide some form of caution, he could be forced to sell the slave ( § 14); more detailed on this: Korzilius (2011) . 73 To mention the name of the PhD-supervisor (Stryk) and the PhD-candidate (Fuchs) in the case of early modern dissertations or theses corresponds to our knowledge on the specific form of academic cooperation between the two of them in the Early Modern Ages (Schubart-Fikentscher, 1970) . I am grateful to prof. Susanne Lepsius, LMU Munich, for this information. 74 "Imo si à saevitia sibi metuat servus, cautio de non offendendo exigi poterit." This quotation is fascinating, because it reveals very well how the topical search for authorities by the jurists of the ius commune functioned. In the original context, the preoccupation of this part of the thesis of Fuchs, guided by Stryk, was with German serfs deserting from the fields because their fear of maltreatments by the vassals who held the land. Obviously, for our Portuguese lawyer the difference of the contexts was no problem at all! The same solution as to German serfs could apply to Portuguese slaves! 75 The quotation of Brunnemann, though, is less pertinent, because Brunnemann does not mention the cautio.
this aim was a kind of freezing injunction (embargo), obtained by an attorney of the "slave", prohibiting the jailor (carcereiro) and prison staff to hand over the "slave" to his master, if the latter would not present the final sentence of a trial "in servitutem" 76 .
At Lisbon, slaves were sometimes imprisoned by their owners at the prison of Belém, near the harbor, to prepare to transport them overseas (mostly to Brazil).
Especially in such cases, the lay brotherhoods hurried to get an injunction 77 . This In some special situations, the positions seem somewhat changed in a paradoxical way, like in the question of sustentation. Whereas under normal conditions it was clear that ownership included the duty to nourish one's slave, owners sometimes refused this when their "property" turned rebellious and dared to claim freedom. Therefore, Rita Thereza had to claim to be maintained in her freedom against her owner, whose property suddenly had turned into a useless burden: without being able to exploit her labor, he would have to pay her a monthly sum, to be supported by the depositary. This sounded absurd to him. If Rita wanted to be sustained, such was his conclusion, she had to come back home and to continue her work. The fact that this incident went up to the highest court of the kingdom demonstrates, to what extent the opposing sides could harden. The Supreme Court decided in favor of Rita, but her owner still did not accept the verdict. He wanted the depository feed her, being the one who could use her laborforce. However, in accordance with dominant opinion, a depository was not allowed to use the deposited thing -and this meant he could not make a deposited slave work for him. But an owner did not admit defeat so easily. Did property not give him the right to auction the labor of his slave off publicly, at least during three days of the week, following the old rule "quidquid acquirit [the slave], domino acquirit"? As the court did not approve this proposal, the owner finally gave up. Unwilling to pay the sum to support the slave during the trial, he conceded liberty.
Summarizing this glance of aspects of the metropolitan freedom suit, we see the Portuguese alms with its procedural peculiarities inherited from Roman law, known by the Visigothic laws, and practiced during the late Middle Ages concerning enslaved Moors, in such a way as to be extended swiftly to black Africans, when they began to arrive in greater numbers at the peninsula during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Slaves could get, and knew how to get access to courts; they were anything but passive objects. Their integration into social networks, especially in the form of lay brotherhoods, helped them to learn about ways and means to make use of the courts.
Proceedings were complex and often lasted for months or even years. An important aspect is that there seems to have always been attorneys ready to assist "slaves". Concerning indigenous Brazilians, the records I found, unfortunately are from the eighteenth century only, but they show the same questions still relevant. Like the Spanish crown, the Portuguese tried to limit indigenous slavery, above all by restricting the cases of just war. But taking into account the ideology of civilizing the savage, the labor policy and strategies of social discipline pursued by the metropolitan government, it was not difficult for the colonial settlers to achieve a kind of legal 80 Lucena Salmoral (1982, p. 498) reports about 3.000 cases decided by the Audiencia of Mexico alone. 81 Acevedo (1599, ad l. 8., tit. 9, lib. 3, p. 346 f.): One of the captive Indios, who existed as a slave, claimed to be freed, and he requested to be pronounced as such by the judge. In the meantime, when there does not exist any title about his unfree status, has he to be freed of the dominion of his owner, and of his servitude? ( compromise, very favorable to their interests: Natives, which they could make work for them, were called "administrados" ("administrated"), and the relationship between the European and his "administrados", in the euphemistic language of the time, comprise a kind of guardianship, serving to educate the Natives in Christendom and European culture. In fact, the settlers used the new institution as nothing more than a fig-leave, must enable their treatment of their gentio like slaves, like chattel. That they did so gets evident especially by three practices: Natives appear like chattel in last wills, they were given as dowry, and they were sold (Monteiro, 1994, p. 147) - transactions absolutely impossible with respect to free persons 82 .
However, was access to courts not extremely difficult for the Native Americans? Some of the first aspects that may come to our mind are language barriers. At a first level, we come across the highly specialized language of the legal professionals, the language of the books, still mostly in Latin. Local lawyers must have had access at least to some of them, mostly compilations of the essentials of ius commune, so called summulae. However, to whom were the Latin quotations in their written pleadings directed? Besides the members of the high courts, even in Portugal, only some larger towns had professionals as judges, the so-called juizes de fora. In smaller towns, the ordinary judge was taken from the senate of the municipal chamber, regularly its president, so he was a layman, and very often not able to understand the juridical Latin of his time, needing translations and explanations, provided by an assessor. In Brazil, the lack of professional judges was even greater. In addition to this first barrier, between professionals and nonprofessionals, or Latin and Portuguese, there is the barrier between Portuguese and Native language(s). The latter does not appear in the records. Nevertheless, that should not mislead us. The oral reality of colonial Brazil was completely different than the one of official written texts.
The spoken language was the língua geral, in southeastern Brazil called paulista or austral, a Tupi-Guarani language (Rodrigues, 2002) . Therefore, the Natives could formulate their claims in a language familiar to them, and only their legal assistants translated them to Portuguese in their writings. Another barrier was that of the legal complexities. However, here an institution already known in the metropolitan legal 82 Here, where I dedicate attention to procedure, I may not enter into the details of that interesting discussion of material law. system helped: miserable and rural people (miserabiles and rustici) enjoyed certain procedural privileges, one of them being the right to get a curator ad litem to assist them. And the Native Americans were seen as an extreme case of poor peasants (Duve, 2008) .
In the Capitania of São Paulo, in 1741, Bartholomeu, "descendant of the Native heathen" ("oriundo do gentio da terra"), stated to be de jure an administrado, but in fact was exploited worse than a slave by Domingos Bicudo. To get free from the latter, he entered court, and asked to be taken away from Bicudo and deposited 83 .
Therefore, he went less far as the case quoted by Acevedo (1599) 
Concluding remarks
Maybe the strongest argument for the thesis of the lack of a rupture between (ancient and medieval) European and modern American slavery is the fact that the synopsis of the freedom trials of fifteenth century Valencia and of eighteenth century Minas Gerais did revealed nearly no difference. European erudite jurisprudence and colonial slavery were not worlds apart. [...] ." In the case, already mentioned, AHCSM AC 1, 420, 9137, fol. 81 (petição do 18 de novembro de 1811), the litigating "slaves" had to serve their owner during three days of the week, but in the case of hard or unjust punishments or maltreatment, the owner should loose these three days ("a pena de perder as mais dias da semana, ou prestação dos serviços dos Sup[licant]es"). 103 See the case of Isabel ("mulata") of the year 1740 (APESP 3327, 1163) . The claimant claimed Isabel as his slave and had her imprisoned when starting a reivindicatio in servitutem against her. Her lawyer used the "exceyção de spolio", quoting Dig. 40.12.10, D. 41.2.3.10 and Justinian Code 7.16.14 (fol. 19 v) ; or the case of Josepha de Oliveira from the year 1750 (APESP AC 3412, 3210), whose lawyer also alleged "espolio" and formulated an "excepção". of slavery passed down by ancient legal semantics was a highly important factor in the formation of New World slave societies, and the centuries-old experience with slavery and slave law "in action" on the Iberian peninsula fostered a certain path-dependency.
Due to the conservatism of the legal profession, voices that globally questioned the possibility to own human beings as property during medieval and early modern times were extremely rare. Colonial slavery was not shaped outside of courts, but largely inside of them. The state, in the form of colonial courts, did interfere into the masterslave-relations, and did influence them decisively. Therefore, the responsibility of the "long robe" in prevented the spread of colonial slavery, by offering cultivated accompaying semantics ("gepflegte Begleitsemantik" as Luhmann would say), should not be overestimated. The space for customary law to develop, to the contrary, was minimal. As the transatlantic comparison shows, we cannot characterize the colonial Brazilian legal system as a hybrid one. The organization of justice in the colony reflected much more the dream of an "immense Portugal", quite like in Chico Buarque de Holanda's ironic "Fado Tropical". We could even speak of a certain self-referentially of the legal system. As to the functioning of the colonial courts, once firmly established, they worked quite well and were not too much criticized by the metropolis. But there was definitely not a one-way-street of the mere reception of European slave law by colonial legal professionals. They also influenced the development of metropolitan law, as in the case of Antonio Vanguerve Cabral, who acted as a judge in Brazil, but whose Pratica judicial (Cabral, 1727 ) became a very important legal book in the second half of the eighteenth century, and saw a re-edition in Lisbon in 1842 104 . Finally, my findings reveal the strong continuity of the symbolic meaning of procedural incidents, by which the tensions between the principles of property and liberty expressed and discharged themselves, but also could be attenuated. In any case, by entering courts, slaves at all times opened a door that their masters and mistresses tried to keep closed. 
